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A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science.
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
Clark (in press) discusses virtues of the
neurocomputational perspective of predic-
tive coding1, as well as evidential, concep-
tual, and methodological limits. I expand
on some such methodological limits by
asking: (1) “Are processes of reducing
informational surprise limited to biologi-
cal brains?” and (2) “Can some hyperpri-
ors be culturally contingent?” My goal is
not to make any specific theoretical contri-
bution, but rather to motion at what form
a multi-level, multi-disciplinary approach
to predictive coding should take.
Clark notes that predictive coding sug-
gests a neurocentric perspective (21ms).
“But dig a little deeper,” he continues,
and this model might extend to bodily
and world-involving processes (Clark, in
press). Clark has long defended a view of
human cognition “extending” into “tools,
notations, and media” (Clark, 1997, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2005, 2008; with Clark and
Chalmers, 1998). Perhaps processes such
as writing notes or asking your partner
to remind you of your upcoming meeting
could count as extended or distributed pro-
cesses of reducing informational surprise.
But what gains accrue from extending the
scope of the predictive coding framework?
First, let us consider how extend-
ing the framework is to pan out. One
way of carving up philosophical per-
spectives on extended cognition is into
two “waves” (Sutton, 2010). These waves
map onto possible interpretations of
extended predictive coding systems. The
first wave is based on functional parity
between the inner and the outer (Clark
and Chalmers, 1998): if some process
involving external and internal resources is
functionally equivalent to an inner, recog-
nizably cognitive process, then the hybrid
process is cognitive as well. Similar reason-
ing could underlie inferences to extended
predictive coding systems if some hybrid
system could realize the process of error
prediction, but I have trouble imagining
a possible example without employing
extreme science fiction. Let’s consider
an Alzheimer’s patient, Otto, and his
trusty notebook filled with his memories
and useful information (from Clark and
Chalmers, 1998). Are there clear hierarchi-
cal levels with corresponding processing
functions [e.g., top-down (predictive),
bottom-up (sensory), and error calculat-
ing] in the hybrid Otto-notebook system?
Do we have here an error-reducing sys-
tem (i.e., Otto’s relevant neural circuitry)
within an error-reducing system (i.e., the
hybrid Otto-notebook system)? The worry
arises that predictive coding is being over-
stretched. A more tenable extension lies
with the second wave. In contrast to par-
ity, second-wave extended cognition takes
the role of external artifacts and media to
be different from but complementary to
that of brains (Sutton, 2010). In some
“techno-dream” cases, external media
(interacting with internal resources) will
realize predictive processes in an analo-
gous fashion to neural activity (parity),
but, in most realistic cases (like Otto and
his notebook), will complement the neu-
ral processes of reducing informational
surprise by fulfilling different functional
roles than the neural circuitry. Extending
the predictive coding framework by
complementarity thus necessitates a “dis-
tribution of explanatory weight” between
the predictive coding framework and
“approaches that explore or uncover the
more idiosyncratic or evolutionary path-
dependent features of the human mind,
and the complex transformative effects of
the socio-cultural niche” (Clark, 28ms). It
seems Clark follows this second-wave per-
spective in stating that predictive coding
models of neural functioning could help
make sense of the “complementary roles
of morphology, action, and environmental
structuring.” (22ms) Thus, human cogni-
tive architecture is more complex than the
brain and predictive coding is only part of
the “cognitive story.” As Clark shows, the
process of minimizing informational sur-
prise certainly goes beyond the brain—as
action selectively samples the environ-
ment to maximize the likelihood of prior
predictions—but is complemented and
potentially made ever more complex by
environmental scaffolding.
The second question concerning
the possibility of cultural hyperpriors
addresses similar methodological limits of
predictive coding. Hyperpriors are intro-
duced in Clark’s discussion of binocular
rivalry. Binocular rivalry occurs when a
subject is presented two different images,
one in each eye. Subjects report a slow
switching between one percept and the
other. Why the images do not combine in
a single percept is explained, within the
predictive coding view, by the fact that the
system has the “general knowledge (. . . )
that, for example, houses and faces are
not present in the same place, at the same
scale, at the same time.” (Clark, 6ms).
This knowledge is a hyperprior: a very
general fact about embodied interaction
1Briefly, the idea that brains are in the business of reducing informational surprise (i.e., the difference between prior predictions and sensory input) by changing
prior predictions or by changing sensory input (via selective sampling or movement).
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with the physical world that structures
and constrains prior predictions and how
they interact. If it weren’t for this general
feature, there wouldn’t necessarily be
competition between the different images
in the case of binocular rivalry.
How general must some knowledge
be in order to count as a hyperprior?
Are there more and less general kinds
of knowledge that structure and con-
strain prior predictions? There is likely
general physical knowledge such as Clark
describes, but perhaps also general cultural
knowledge concerning things like normal
standing distance between interlocutors
of certain kinds. Cultural hyperpriors
would likely need to be described by
the “path-dependent disciplines” rather
than the predictive coding framework
alone, thus further necessitating the
multi-level, multi-disciplinary method-
ology seemingly required for investigating
specific real-world processes of reducing
informational surprise. As Clark puts it,
“this again raises questions about the
eventual spread of explanatory weight
between the framework on offer and
any additional resources that may be
required to determine the nature and
shape of the hyperpriors that shape the
processing and experience of evolved
life-forms.” (25ms).
In conclusion, the potential prac-
tical value of the predictive coding
framework in complementing and coop-
erating with the disciplines studying
path-dependent phenomena is yet to be
determined. However, I venture the bet
that, despite predictive coding’s success
in constructing models and describ-
ing neurocomputational activity, even
larger strides will be made through
such a multi-level, multi-disciplinary
approach.
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